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A Call for Existentialism 
Orson Welles' Citizen Kane showed America a tragic ascension from a child of poverty to an 
elder of great affluence. The American dream that so many of us strive to obtain became a 
nightmare of pride and worthlessness. Its popularity is undeniable - many "Top 100" lists place 
the film at the very top. Many also hail The Great Gatsby as the greatest American novel. Our 
society loves to tell itself that our ideals of life are often empty - that there is something 
dreadfully wrong. Thankfully, there is always someone reminding us of the potential for 
personal significance and self-actualization. Whether simply the contemporary United States of 
America, the whole western world, or even humanity as a whole, we are asking ourselves deeply 
existential questions with manifest discomfort. Three recent films, which have all been 
welcomed by great popularityboth in American circles and abroad, have asked us the existential 
question: "Who are you?" At the center of each of these films, questions of identity, meaning, 
and self are raised in front of a society that responds with thrill and excitement. Watching these 
films brings us - those of us bothered by the films in some way at least - to re-evaluate our 
significance. We say, "What is it about my own self that makes it me, and do I like that? Is this 
what I really am, or something that has been chosen for me?" 
The most comic and unconventional of the three, Being John Malkovich proposes a 
mechanism of science fiction and fantasy - or perhaps more appropriately of Descartes. A low 
and uncertain puppeteer happens upon a tunnel within his office building that leads into John 
Malkovich's mind. The tunnel becomes a business venture, and the movie a "film of the 
absurd." A semi-physical space within Malkovich' s mind holds the secret to choice and will. 
Central to the film however, the desire for autonomy and valid identity tortures an array of 
emotional characters that have taken trips there. Questions about the soul and its relationship to 
the body and self accompany a sense that the central characters are starving for meaning. 
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Significance is absent from their lives until the tunnel is discovered - and the new identity 
liberates them. In addition, Malkovich is neither particularly attractive nor personally charming; 
yet being inside another person's existence is so thrilling to the main players and the dozens who 
line up for the ride, that they become obsessed with its otherness. The movie shows its 
audiences how invigorating an alternate identity must be. Further, certain existential issues such 
as denial of death, responsibility in life, and authenticity of self are raised though not necessarily 
resolved. Not only do people here take conscious control of another's body regularly, they 
themselves seem lost searching for a claim to their own bodies. 
Role-playing is something that most children experience as a vital learning tool that 
contributes to social perception and behavior. It is also a common behavior among adults who 
gain a thrill from escaping into another existence where worries and problems of the present and 
past melt away. One can look at many modern phenomena as evidence of the newfound 
popularity of such routines. Online chat boards, virtual reality, a whole class and the majority of 
current video games, and even something as simple and ancient as dramatic acting all give 
evidence to the delight of escaping away into someone else. Is the film critical of such behavior? 
If this is the case, the only expression of criticism lies in the central character that eventually 
maintains lasting control of Malkovich. His motivations for becoming another are not indicative 
of a personal quest for the self. He takes control because he wants control. He fulfills desires 
and aspirations that would not have been possible in his previous self. He makes forceful, 
intrinsic changes that defy his true self. The puppeteer is the only character punished in the film. 
Puppets are a central theme of Being John Malkovich for a reason. They show us that we all are 
guided by an array of strings and rarely take the time to look inward at the puppeteer. 
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Perhaps more directly addressing existential issues of personal responsibility and 
individual authenticity, Fight Club stirs an interesting mix of Sartre and Freud beneath a frosting 
of violence and alienation. Important issues in the film span a variety of social criticisms; yet the 
core of the movie proposes to its audience that mainstream middle class America is slowly 
hollowing itself out. We fill ourselves with Starbucks, furniture catalogs, and sports cars. Our 
central protagonist, an unnamed narrator who at one point calls himself Cornelius, finds himself 
at the beginning of the movie depressed and sleepless. Finding comfort and sleep becomes 
possible only after he begins to take on phony alternate identities in order to attend group therapy 
sessions. Testicular cancer, tuberculosis, and sickle cell anemia: these false disorders become 
his sense of meaning and cause for release of all the angst that has built up through his life. His 
disease is not as tangible as those of the support groups - he suffers from anonymity. Cornelius 
becomes confronted with an inner id that resists his lifestyle with so much passion that a second 
personality develops: Tyler Durden. This new personality starts Fight Club as just that - a club 
for fighting among young and middle aged men - a release from the pressures of the Id. This is 
not evident until the end of the film (that Tyler is his alternate personality) and therefore all of 
the fights Cornelius has with him become solitary in retrospect. He is fighting his inner self for 
determination of who he should be. This symbolism is strong, yet direct admonitions of other 
messages litter the script: "You are not your job. You are not how much you have in the bank. 
You are not the contents of your wallet." In one scene, Tyler drags a convenience store clerk to 
the back lot and puts a gun to his head. He asks him, what did you really want to be? After 
confused crying and pleas for mercy, the man finally responds, "A vet." Tyler then threatens 
him, promising to come after him if he hasn't started to become a vet in a year. Cornelius is 
confused until Tyler tells him, "Tomorrow that man will have the best day of his life. His 
breakfast in the morning will be the best meal he's ever had." 
More issues of authenticity and autonomy in our identities, our collective and individual 
responsibilities, and the existential confrontation of our deaths are raised - while the audience 
witnesses a painful struggle for the resolution of two selves into one. The nameless man who 
works for the nameless car company in a nameless town conflicts dramatically with Tyler 
Durden, a man whose name is known all over the country and whose occupation is terribly 
unconventional in comparison. Two men live in one, and the confrontation of the narrator's 
internal pathos with his social ethos almost kills him. 
More traditional in at least its outward appearance, American Beauty won five academy 
awards in 1999. Lester Burnham introduces and concludes the film, and it is his story that 
shapes it. His career is miserably indefinite, his home desperately normal, and his family 
depressingly distant. Lester has a revelation that that which he found important in his life is 
meaningless, and that his sense of personal identity has been destroyed by these motivations. 
Heidegger describes this process as leveling. Society's measure of the desirable, impressing 
itself upon him and choosing the path of his life for him, has failed Lester. At response to this 
realization, Lester begins to choose. With deliberation, he begins to establish an identity and a 
way of life that truly appeals to his potential self. The Lester that he becomes is less what his 
culture has decided he should be, and so much more of what he actually is, and loves being. 
Passion re-enters his life, and perspective descends like a blessing upon a previously blind 
existence. Lester's passion for life is short-lived, however, for he is killed at the conclusion of 
the film after merely hours of valid self-knowledge and absolved anxiety. Is Lester punished for 
his success at resolute choice? His death at the crest of enlightenment may simply be a 
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representation of the tragedy in modern life, yet the central point of the film remains clear: the 
suburban world too often hides significance and authentic life beneath concerns that are so trivial 
that they strangle our identities into nothingness. 
Martin Heidegger, concerned with identity and authenticity issues very similar to those 
mentioned above, discusses them in an existential context. It is evident from the films described 
above that a call to existential thought is occurring in America. Whether or not this 
philosophical movement is currently unique to the States or even prevalent today, many 
American people, especially of younger generations, are asking for help and answers to 
important existential questions. This school of thought is therefore valid on at least some levels 
as a viewpoint from which to analyze contemporary social phenomenon. Several thinkers have 
recently declared that this process of social leveling is reducing individual authenticity through 
one particularly controversial drug: Prozac. 
This infamous name is the commercial term for Fluoxetine - the first developed Selective 
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor. SSRI's, self explanatory in name, control levels in the human 
neuron of serotonin, a neurotransmitter with an experimentally proven relationship to depression, 
anxiety, and general affect. l Effectively, an SSRI inserts itself into a pump that functions as a 
conduit for neurotransmitters, limiting the capacity of serotonin sensitive neurons to reuptake the 
free serotonin in the synapse, thus increasing the level of serotonin available to receptors in the 
synapse. As a result, the number of receptors at the receiving end of a neural connection is 
down-regulated, and signals become prolonged. Other successful drug treatments for depression, 
anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OeD) have been found to inhibit important 
receptors in the brain as well, causing often strong and immediate side effects. Prozac and its 
relatives have become especially popular because these problems are far less prevalent and 
severe in Prozac users. 
SSRI's are called "selective" because their design only directly affects serotonin 
receptors in the brain. This terminology is misleading, however, for the wide array of chemical 
interactions at work in the brain functions as a complex system with interactions occurring in an 
exceedingly complicated fashion. There is experimental evidence2 suggesting that changes in 
synaptic serotonin levels are correlated with opposing changes in dopamine, another 
neurotransmitter that performs similar functions for different behaviors and biochemical states. 
Exact evidence of how these reactions occur is not yet clear, yet there are a number of instances 
of permanent and highly destructive side effects occurring as a result of other psychotropic 
medications3 that directly affect dopamine levels.4 Dopamine neurons that project from the 
substantia negra to the basal ganglia have been implicated in tics resulting from Thorazine use,s 
and Joseph Glenmullen suggests from his findings that a similar reaction occurs indirectly 
through Prozac use.6 
These concerns are just one kind of many that have arisen since the advent of 
psychotropic medicine. From an existentialist perspective, a major concern of a marketed drug 
that induces symptoms deemed more normal or appropriate by the current culture is that the 
authentic identities of the individuals within that culture may be compromised. Or worse, the 
introduction and phenomenal popularity of SSRI' s may compromise the core of our society 
itself. The central argument made in most professionally published articles on this issue 
concerns personal authenticity, autonomy, and change. Further, they ask if Prozac use is 
explicitly inauthentic, or under what conditions one could describe its use as authentic. 
Seemingly, the concept of authenticity held by these academics is slippery and difficult to grasp 
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in explicit terms. A more direct analysis of authenticity and the explicit ways in which it relates 
to changes in personal identity would contribute substantially to an understanding either side of 
the authenticity argument. The purpose of this project therefore, is to establish conditions of 
authentic or inauthentic change, present the prevailing arguments concerning the appropriateness 
and authenticity of Prozac therapy, and finally to ascertain the explicit Prozac situations for 
which one could attribute evaluations of authenticity. 
Conditions of Authentic Personal Change 
One of Heidegger' s most ubiquitous contributions to philosophical argument, the notion of 
personal authenticity has provoked many contemporary thinkers into re-evaluating notions of 
self concept and self-attainment. Several have argued that Kierkegaard's writings on the same 
issue predate Heidegger's and are perhaps more robust in light of critical analysis. Sartre, 
Nietzsche, and Camus have contributed further to our culture's conception of authenticity, and 
psychologists such as Viktor Frankl and Rollo May have with substantial success transferred 
existential ideas of the self into viable methods of psychotherapy. Although there is substantial 
room for differentiation between these thinkers and their approach to authenticity, the concept 
retains a broad conceptual definition and description across Existential thought. Such a 
description will be attempted here, with an emphasis on what possible modes of personal change 
are allowed within the scope of authenticity. 
An explicit definition of personal authenticity seems at first relatively simple. Three of 
the OED definitions of authentic do not relate specifically to objects or legal validity. "S. Real, 
actual, 'genuine ... ' 7. Belonging to himself, own, proper; 8. Acting of itself, self-originated ... " 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary adds "true to one's own personality, spirit, or character." The 
application of these concepts to individuals is not difficult to imagine. Following several 
theories of the self, one can conceive of an inauthentic person whose behavior defies that 
person's interior motivations and self-concept. However, this approach is not terribly useful in 
truly comprehending Heidegger's notion of authenticity. 
One way of understanding authenticity requires a set of categories under which all 
personal approaches to the self can be classified. Heidegger's sense of authentic or inauthentic 
behavior manifests in the following modes of being: 'Inauthenticity' occurs when an individual 
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acts in the interest of fitting well with others. 'Averageness' occurs when someone who may 
have once embraced an authentic self no longer attempts to achieve differentiation or fulfillment. 
'Everydayness' happens similarly when a person no longer changes or critically evaluates the 
self. 'Publicness' is a manifestation of fame, and occurs when someone losses the self in order 
to support a public image. Authenticity, unlike the previous four categories of self, occurs in a 
person who actively chooses self-differentiation, awareness, and achievement. This categorical 
approach to understanding authenticity facilitates an understanding of existential values, yet 
other approaches deal with the problematic construct in different ways. 
One of these approaches attempts to deal with authenticity in a more indirect fashion. 
Golomb argues that a positive definition of authenticity would be self-nullifying,7 and therefore 
prefers to define inauthenticity instead. He evokes Sartre in describing authenticity as a negative 
term - "something we are aware of when we flee it." Its presence is discerned in shifts of 
inauthenticity. Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger categorize three forms of the inauthentic that 
are latent in all of us as elements of human existence. Each form is also rooted in an aspect of 
temporality. Heidegger associates ambiguity with the past, idle talk with the present, and 
curiosity with the future. These are all in turn negative to the extent that they are manifestations 
of behavior devoid of true meaning for the potential self. Each category also has a positive 
counterpart that contributes to or stems from authenticity: feeling as one finds oneself, discourse, 
and understanding, respectively.8 Later, Golomb describes authenticity in the specific context of 
Heidegger's concept of Dasein. "To be authentic Dasein, therefore, is to grasp that one cannot 
become authentic as an ontic entity among entities, as a static being, but only as the asking, 
searching [being].,,9 Authenticity here is not a property or a state, but rather more of a process. 
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A personal change that would risk a loss of authenticity as Golomb has described it 
would therefore positively define inauthenticity. Rather than describing those changes that are 
authentic, one can appropriately follow Sartre and Golomb's example. Inauthentic personal 
change becomes in this case those processes of change made in flight from one's potential 
authenticity. Perhaps changes related intrinsically to idle talk, curiosity, or ambiguity are also 
implicated under this model. 10 It is perhaps difficult to imagine an inauthentic and voluntaristic 
personal change resulting from idle talk or curiosity under this system. They are 1) founded in 
the ignorance and pretense of the public, 1 1 2) result from an absence of care rather than a 
presence of intention, 12 and 3) lack a procedural nature. Ambiguity however, is more ominous 
when related to personal change. Whereas idle-talk and curiosity occur as specific occasions or 
events, ambiguity develops over time. Decisions made by the individual that create ambiguity 
by increasing self-avoidance at the expense of self-awareness must be considered directly 
inauthentic under this model. Actions or especially personal projects undertaken in order to 
escape from an anxiety-provoking element of personal experience, or from an awareness of that 
element, necessarily increase ambiguity and must damage this sense of personal authenticity. 
McDonough' s approach to defining personal authenticity takes an Aristotelian position 
and asserts, "Authenticity and inauthenticity are not. .. contrary states," and can be 
simultaneously present in an individual self.1 3 Under this model, authenticity is represented as a 
mode of inauthenticity - a state described as the 'priority of inauthenticity.' Passages from 
Being and Time support the notion that authenticity seems like a modification or property of the 
they-self and everydayness. McDonough equates these ideas with in authenticity, perhaps too 
readily, but continues only to cite passages from the same text that directly dispute this claim. 
They create a state in which priority lies with authenticity. His conclusion and the resolution of 
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this conflict is an Aristotelian approach - equating the relationship between authenticity and 
inauthenticity with the relationship between form and matter. The argument continues further 
and applies itself to Aristotelian notions of individuality. McDonough labels a new kind of self-
individuality to distinguish it from organic individuality, and subsequently defines authenticity in 
terms of a categorical distinction, "[A]uthentic individuality consists precisely in transcending 
one's natural types.,,14 That which makes one authentic, in other words, is that which is not 
derived from natural type. This type is seemingly one determined by biology and sociology. 
Authenticity here becomes something like traits distinguishable from those of other members of 
the same group; and further, these traits are chosen at will to be evoked by the authentic 
individual. Although accounting handily for the existential importance of freedom, this approach 
seems to render issues of anxiety and resolution less than important to the true distinction 
between authenticity and inauthenticity. Arguably, such a change in the nature of the theory 
removes the specifically existential nature of Heidegger' s notion of authenticity. 
Despite this possible incongruence, an evident distinction between personal changes as 
either authentic or inauthentic can be made from McDonough's argument. Choices made that 
differentiate an individual from his peers (of whatever sort) plainly contribute to that individual's 
authenticity. What choices could then be distinguished as resulting in a loss of authenticity? 
Personal changes of the self that are made explicitly in order to remove those qualities that set an 
individual apart from his natural grouping can be described as inauthentic under this Aristotelian 
model. 
llham Dilman approaches the Existential issue of authenticity within the context of a 
critique of Cartesian thought. His approach emphasizes that the series of events comprising a 
person's life can be said to contribute to his authenticity to the extent that he himself participates 
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in his own 'intellectual and emotional learning. ,15 This notion as described by Dilman can be 
divided into three qualifications that distinguish a personal change as authentic. Primarily, the 
individual must be an active agent in his own development. Reasonably, outside forces can and 
necessarily do contribute to personal growth, yet he whose life seeks authenticity makes an 
assertive and crucial contribution to that life through decision-making and attitude. 
Subsequently, one must maintain personal responsibility and answerability for the self. Dilman 
interprets Sartre in general terms by noting that an authentic person not only enters into his own 
development, but also claims responsibility for his actions and hesitations. One must be 
"answerable ... for who he is, as well as for failing to be who he is.,,16 For Sartre and others, 
responsibility demands awareness as well. 17 Without continuous self-evaluation, one cannot 
maintain awareness and therefore has no true capacity to answer for his own self and its nature. 
Finally, Dilman discloses the issue of resolution. For Dilman, decision-making and choice as 
described above are not as critical as Sartre insists. Important resolutions are resolved through 
affective processes such as assimilation or grieving - neither through a calculated verdict 1 8 nor a 
claim to answerability. Emotionality and psychological coping mechanisms seem to be evoked 
here. Resolution as a process is integral to an understanding of authentic choice in slightly 
different ways as well. One can conceive of this not only as an affective process designed to 
deal with conflict, but also as the resulting ongoing union of conflicting elements in the self. 
There are therefore three fundamentals of authenticity - choice, awareness, and resolution. Each 
will be used as a position from which to create theoretical arguments for the relationship between 
authenticity and personal change. 
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Choice 
The first of these three elements entails far more than a simple decision or preference. Choice 
and freedom are essential to existential thought in that the essence of existence is defined by 
choice itself. Sartre contends that freedom of choice is plainly concurrent with man's being, and 
. definitive to its nature, 19 Heidegger associates individual decision making with finding the self,2o 
Jaspers describes choice as defining the self,21 and Kierkegaard's writings imply that choice is 
implied in the very structure of the self as finite and actualized freedom. In his Existence and 
Freedom, Shrag asserts in development of this last notion that "choice is the indispensable 
condition for an attainment of an authentic awareness and acceptance of one's finitude.,,22 This 
concept is evidently not just fundamental to an understanding of existential authenticity, but also 
more universally to an understanding of the self. 
Kierkegaard describes several illusions of choice, or circumstances under which one ' s 
Dasein perceives a choice that is either unwilled or partial. One example of such a choice would 
be made for aesthetic reasons: 
Therewith you have chosen ... not, to be sure, as you yourself will admit, the 
better part. But in reality you have not chosen at all, or it is in an improper sense 
of the word you have chosen. Your choice is an aesthetic choice. 23 
Aesthetic here applies not to art, but to immediacy, pleasurable preference, and perhaps even 
hedonism or rationalism, which all fall under Kierkegaard's description of the aesthetic 
existence-sphere. Life for an aestheticist is simply a succession of nows, and Kierkegaard is 
very critical of such a lifestyle. True, authentic choice must be a choice made with total self-
possession,24 genuine pathos,25 and a regard for all temporal modes - past, present, and future. 
Choice is also more than the decisions made at critical turning points in an individual's lifestyle. 
It is the earnestness and resoluteness with which a choice is made that determines its validity, yet 
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this will be discussed in more detail later. Further, choice taken to a more metaphorical level, 
and pointed back at the individual making the choice creates a new dimension of this concept. 
Ultimately, choice here is not just decisions made at critical moments, but perhaps even a state of 
one having chosen himself over the they-self 
"Even the richest personality is nothing before he has chosen himself, and on the other 
hand, even what one might call the poorest personality is everything when he has chosen 
himself; for the great thing is not to be this or that but to be oneself.,,26 
In a sense, the choice of oneself over the public ethos is also critical to this notion, pointing back 
to McDonough's interpretation of authenticity. 
Kierkegaard refers to the public on several occasions as a "monstrous abstraction,,27 that 
can and does assume the function of making decisions for the individual. As a result, we find 
Heidegger describing all of those who do not take an active, assertive, and attentive role in their 
own personal development as becoming a "stultifying standardization and conventionalism in 
which everyone is undecided.,,28 Heidegger also discusses a process of leveling, the name he 
gives to the tendency of the public to remove those aspects of Dasein that distinguish an 
individual from the crowd.29 Inauthenticity is portrayed in Being and Time as a ' temptation' 
present at the ontic level of public everydayness. Escape into distraction and equanimity, away 
from the anxiety that in itself calls us to acknowledge our potential for the authentic - this is the 
temptation offered by the public that levels members of a society towards its norms. 
Are there means of personal change not yet discussed that as a result of these ideas 
become decidedly inauthentic? McDonough's position on authenticity has already revealed the 
nature of those changes made to fit the crowd. Choice however, sheds light on how one could in 
fact undergo personal change not as a result of individual motivation, but from the decision made 
by the "monstrous abstraction" of the public. If at any time one opts not to choose his own 
personal outcome, the public to which he belongs will eventually choose one for him. Without 
making the decision that the self is the ultimate choice of his existence, the human being loses 
his authenticity as the crowd takes control of personal development. This position of not 
choosing the self levels man, producing a "fractional, depersonalized, and irresponsible man. It 
reduces him to ... [being] identified with his functions.,, 3o Such a state is unquestionably 
inauthentic from an existential standpoint. Heidegger describes an individual subjected to such 
leveling such as this as "fallen" and "anonymous.,,31 
Awareness 
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The second fundamental of authenticity distinguished, awareness is closely intertwined with this 
complex issue of choice. As stated above, true choice is made with resolve and concern, and 
existential choice chooses the self. Kierkegaard's definition of self is interesting to note in this 
context, however. In his Sickness unto Death he evaluates the self as purely a reflexive relation, 
or perhaps duplication.32 For Kierkegaard, the self is explicitly the act of self-evaluation. 
Further, Sartre defines authenticity by saying that it "consists of having a true and lucid 
consciousness of the situation, responsibility for the self, and acceptance of the self.,,33 
Knowledge of the self - awareness of what thoughts, feelings, and motivations create one - must 
preface these three qualities Sartre discusses. Consciousness immediately follows from self-
know ledge, true responsibility in essence requires this consciousness likewise to be realized, and 
self acceptance can obviously only occur in actuality if the individual understands that self which 
it accepts to some limited degree. 
As Golomb points out, dislocation from the self is a theoretical necessity of self-
evaluation. Simply put, one must step outside oneself in order to truly evaluate it beyond the 
signs it receives from alien sources. One can learn of his own behavior, and even determine his 
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motivations, strictly from observing the behaviors and reactions of those around him, yet such an 
evaluation of the self is doomed to inadequacy. From an existential perspective, self observation 
made solely through the eyes of others would be hollow. Such a viewpoint of the self roots it in 
societal norms and ethos, and strips the true identity and uniqueness to be found there. The 
leveling process described earlier becomes an even more personally directed act when self-
awareness is limited to others. Authentic self-evaluation must therefore point inward and seek 
knowledge that independently describes and differentiates the individual. True responsibility for 
a self defined strictly in terms of social evaluations is impossible. What binds a man to those 
actions, emotions, and motivations he experiences and potentially owns, if social referencing is 
his only method of self-definition? True acceptance of the self likewise cannot be made if the 
self that is accepted is defined untenably. Direct self-evaluation from an assumed dislocated 
perspective is therefore crucial to a move towards authentic change. 
Berthold-Bond describes the "resoluteness" of Heidegger' s authenticity as a "re-
encounter [with] the self, no longer. .. absorbed in its unreflective fascination with the everyday," 
but awakened in a dislocated "moment of vision.,,34 This moment of vision described by 
Heidegger is directly provoked by anxiety. His approach to anxiety is perhaps one of the most 
important elements of existentialism, and its role in authenticity is crucial. Only through 
accepting one's own self and the anxiety that comes with approaching such awareness can one 
reach towards personal authenticity. Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger insist that anxiety is the 
"gateway to authentic existence,,,35 for only through suffering can one truly come to question and 
evaluate the self. Shrag further notes that experiences of anxiety reveal three aspects of Dasein: 
1) the strange and uncanny; 2) isolation and loneliness; and 3) freedom for authentic 
potentiality. Without anxiety, Dasein would have no awareness that authenticity and 
inauthenticity are potential qualities of its being.36 Anxiety can therefore be described as a call 
to awareness, or a communication of being-in-the-world made to the self. This notion will be 
discussed in further detail later. 
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Several implications on intentional personal change arise here. First, a change made in 
avoidance of or in replacement for personal knowledge and self-awareness must be inauthentic. 
Acceptance of the self must be made before true change can occur towards the potential self. 
With no knowledge of why the previous self held its certain properties, with no understanding of 
why it should be changed and what consequences such a change may have on the individual 
Dasein, such a change is more accurately a shift towards a different, more desirable self. 
Changes made in an effort to improve and maintain the self can only occur with awareness and 
comprehension - without these, such a process becomes metaphorical burial and self-imposed 
Ignorance. 
The social sphere holds as much importance as the personal one, for changes motivated 
by self-evaluations that are fixed in judgments made strictly by the crowd are inauthentic. Few 
of our personal goals or accomplishments are devoid of societal motivation. Our life is 
inextricably bound up in interaction with others, and caring for the opinions of those around us. 
Heidegger himself understood and integrated this notion into his ideology.37 This distinction is 
necessary, however, in order to point out that personal change must be primarily individual and 
earnest, while educated and aware, in order to escape the temptation of distraction that society 
has to offer. If one does not choose himself, the crowd will choose for him. 
Lastly, an act made in avoidance of existential anxiety is decidedly inauthentic, especially 
under the circumstance that the anxious in no way seeks to understand the source of this anxiety. 
Such is evident, as Heidegger's descriptions of inauthenticity repeatedly evoke images of fleeing 
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and escape from potentiality. This anxiety calls awareness into being, and such a process is often 
portrayed in existential fiction as very painful and difficult, yet liberating in conclusion.38 These 
writers, at least, have a conception of authenticity that requires painful self-analysis - and a 
talent to describe alienation in the most treacherous fashion. Perhaps the most tormenting 
element of this new vision-in-anxiety is the actual inauthenticity of the individual. Such a 
realization, coupled with significant import, would be theoretically quite devastating to a 
person's sense of self. Running from the anxiety that begs for the release of such knowledge is 
an expected response, yet it solves nothing if the resolution of this anxiety is the desired end. 
Resolution 
From these categories of authenticity - awareness and choice - several clear situations of 
personal change that could be labeled as inauthentic surface. One final category of personal 
change through which authenticity could be evaluated is resolution.39 Despite the fact that the 
perspective is less frequently cited among commentaries on Heidegger, resolution holds 
relevance to the issue in several ways. As is evident above, choice and awareness are worth little 
if they are held with slight resolve. Important in the degree to which one commits to oneself and 
takes full reasonability for those qualities, resolve solidifies identity through the perspective of 
motivation: strong enthusiasm implies a strong personal commitment. 
Secondary to this, one should normally find difficulty resolving conflicts of the self. In 
the case that one has attributes or motivations that hinder one another, anxiety naturally leads to 
self-denial and a lapse of awareness. Resolution is important therefore, in determining the 
degree to which one can align disparate qualities of the self into a cohesive whole. If (despite 
discomfort) the capacity or level of effort put forth towards justifying such qualities is low, one 
has little potential to ever truly accept or embrace valid and integral aspects of his personality 
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and experience. Resolution here becomes the process by which internal conflict is resolved. As 
above, the 'easy' path that circumvents complicated conflicts indicates a self-perpetuating 
inauthentic route in one's personal projects. 
Finally, a third perspective of authenticity in the category of resolution calls upon anxiety 
itself. Psychodynamic thought explains uncomfortable sensations such as depression, anxiety, or 
OeD not in terms of a disrupted biological balance or an inappropriate learned behavior, but 
rather as a symptom of the need for the ego to resolve conflict between opposing internal drives. 
The humanity of a person and the experiences that he or she goes through create psychological 
states both good and bad. Resoluteness or resolution can also be described as the counter-weight 
with which the desires that do not work well within us maintain equilibrium. Through 
symptomology, conflicts are resolved and the subconscious lets off steam - uncomfortable 
attributes of the self are still the self, and are not instruments of outside intervention. In addition, 
one must acknowledge the role that such symptoms play in our personal experience as agents of 
resolution, or the authentic self has been avoided. 
To sum up, if one assumes that a psychodynamic perspective has at least conceptual 
validity, one can therefore conclude that resolution is integral to authentic change in three ways: 
1 - If one is resolute in his commitment to his personal change, the process becomes more 
authentic. 2 - If one resolves the anxiety of personal conflict through confrontation rather than 
circumvention, one engages in authentic change. 3 - If one addresses uncomfortable personal 
behaviors as an agent of balance within the self, rather than a biological symptom of an alien dis-
ease, one has taken an authentic approach to self-understanding. 
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Transition 
Personal change occurs in all members of humanity, as a natural result of learning and the 
confrontation with experience that is life. Further, it is our obligation to our own experiences, 
and to our own sense of fulfillment, to be ourselves. One would not dare to expect perpetual 
authenticity of the most acetic sort from each and every individual, regardless of exclusive 
situations at all times. Heidegger and Kierkegaard understood and accepted the fact that social 
beings require social interaction, and that most of life is conducted along the lines of inauthentic 
experience. We learn primarily through imitation of our family, elders, and peers - not through 
individuation of unique qualities or motivations. One does not need to choose which value meal 
at McDonalds one would prefer based on the implications such a choice has on internalized 
childhood anxieties. It is critical to note, however, that although most of life may be inauthentic, 
critical times arise at which choices of the self must be made carefully, and with regard for the 
importance of authenticity and the role that it plays in personal development. 
For example, one should evaluate one's career carefully, in order to ensure that it has 
personal significance - even if that significance lies only in supporting a family or one's 
aspirations to maintain other, less profitable pursuits. One should evaluate parenting, teaching, 
political ideology based on personal alignment to specific issues - not along comfortable lines 
delineated by Heidegger's monstrous abstraction. And why should one evaluate anything? -
What allows me to make the judgment that anyone should do anything at all? We owe it to 
ourselves to actualize our inner motivations, to create significance and satisfaction where it is 
possible. We owe it to ourselves to understand and participate actively in the emotional and 
internal events that occur every day. We owe it to our friends, our families, and our peers to 
attempt to understand the interpersonal effects of our behaviors as well. Perhaps however, 
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dramatically different from this idea of obligation, a much truer and less comforting truth exists. 
Is it possible that the one thing we should do is to take responsibility and ownership of those 
things that compose us? We should face ourselves head on, and doing so realistically requires 
making important and explicit choices at distinct moments. There are times in all of our lives 
when we realize, "The choice I make here and now will specify who I am." 
A very specific example of this sort of choice has arisen over the past several years, with 
the advent of a drug that reportedly induces personal change of a socially desirable sort - with 
little physical consequence, relative monetary ease, and a small sacrifice to time. Prozac, and the 
family of drugs described by the acronym SSRI, have asked us, "Would you like to be more 
productive and content without directly resolving all of the personal problems that have 
developed in your life? Do you enjoy this self that you have become? What does it mean to be 
you?" 
What are we to answer? Apparently, America has decided to answer by saying yes to 
Prozac. Sub-clinical prescriptions of Prozac use are shockingly common, seemingly 
administered regularly by medical professionals with little to no experience with anti-
depressants. Many of us have come to accept that Prozac fixes a chemical imbalance in the brain 
that has nothing to do with our personal experience and the complex development of our 
personal selves. We are listening to Prozac, and believing the lies that it tells us about ourselves. 
This drug describes our emotional experiences as robotic reactions to ephemeral disease entities 
for which we have no responsibility. This drug tells us what behavior and temperaments are best 
for today's world, and medicalizes the rest. This drug turns our anxiety, depression, and 
alienation into a pest that should be exterminated without recognition for its significance or 
source. 
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Prozac treats these conditions on a clinical level with surprising efficacy and sympathetic 
side effects,40 yet there are dangerous side effects that have not been addressed outside of 
clinical and biological research, and most practitioners (and especially the general public) are 
ignorant of this evidence.41 The implications of Prozac use on the authenticity of individuals in 
our society has been debated hotly, though theoretical evidence for the inauthenticity of Prozac 
use is often flimsy and unelaborated - almost intuitive in nature. The following section will 
address the first major public release of ethical and philosophical debate over the concern with 
Prozac: Listening to Prozac by Peter D. Kramer. A discussion of newer issues of enhancement 
technology follows, and in conclusion the specific situations of authenticity described above will 
be compared with sub-clinical Prozac use in an effort to assess the validity of prevalent claims 
that SSRI drug therapy is an inauthentic mode of personal change. 
Listening to Alienation 
Listening to Prozac spawned intense discussion and debate in many circles across the United 
States, as it confronted newly surfacing issues of prescription drug use. The book presents case 
studies of Prozac patients, and discusses concerns with the drug in light of these individuals. 
Problems that Kramer senses in the public and professional settings are raised and seemingly 
resolved with a warning and ultimately support for the treatment. Kramer rightly senses the 
dangers of biological materialism, especially when discussing the ethics of SSRI' s, yet 
seemingly fails to heed his own warning. He seems disturbed by his own case of biological 
materialism, yet continues to make errors in support of his claims that spawn from such an 
ideology. 
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There are critical elements of existentialist authenticity that Kramer's Listening to Prozac 
addresses, yet fails to resolve. First, Kramer mentions and denies Sullivan's issues with mood 
enhancers regarding autonomy in processes of personal change. Second, he restates and disputes 
Nesse's argument that there exists a human utility in anxiety. Lastly, he summarizes and 
undermines Schwartz's claims that Prozac interferes with the appropriate resolution of anxiety. 
Each of these three notions provide evidence for the inauthenticity of SSRI' s as isolated 
treatment, and although Kramer challenges them all as invalid, he fails to do so convincingly. 
Social arguments against the use of Prozac are not new, and Kramer takes the opportunity 
to defend its use while "mood brighteners" was still the commonly used name for prescription 
drugs used in sub-clinica142 situations. The phrase refers to any class of drugs that upsets the 
balance of risk and benefit by which questionable treatments can be evaluated. Such a process 
occurs when a drug such as Prozac arises and causes neither addiction nor adverse side effects.43 
Robert Aranow and Mark Sullivan wrote an article44 on mood brighteners in an effort to discuss 
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philosophical and concrete issues that arise from such a class of drugs. They argue that the 
resolution of the "lost yardstick" for ethical evaluation occurs only by using a new one: 
autonomy. lllness compromises autonomy, and therefore valid treatment includes an addicting 
drug, or one with side effects. An addicting drug, without medical justification, along the same 
lines compromises autonomy through compulsion. The use of mood brighteners, because 
unjustified by an actual illness, compromises autonomy by removing an individual from valid 
components of personal experience - such as despair. Kramer dissolves this argument by 
asserting that the hypothetical sub-clinical patient used in many models such as this one does not 
exist, and does not respond to Prozac in a way that fits this model. He finds that in the majority 
of his patients their sense of personal autonomy is not compromised because many choose not to 
take the drug any longer after witnessing its effects on their behavior. One of his first case 
studies mentioned involves a young man who decides not to take the drug any longer, because its 
use convinced him that those aspects of his self that he was initially trying to remove were so 
personal that their absence made him uncomfortable. Further, the understanding of mood 
brighteners embraced by Aranow and Sullivan does not represent Kramer's conception of 
Prozac, and the argument is therefore invalid. In addition, Kramer's interpretation of the 
problems to which Prozac should apply justifies them as states worthy of medical treatment. He 
portrays his patients as "struggling, handicapped, and often socially isolated. ,,45 Perhaps Kramer 
avoids the argument that Aranow and Sullivan make by addressing different issues: the nature of 
Prozac and its interaction with human behavior, and the diagnosis of psychological states as 
'normal' or worthy of treatment. 
Kramer brings up several other viewpoints concerning Prozac, in order to refute their 
claims that its widespread use is personally and socially unhealthy. The first of these in his 
26 
chapter "The Message in the Capsule," is a protest brought by Richard Schwartz, which claims, 
"mood brighteners interfere with a person's relationship with reality.,,46 Schwartz concedes that 
his argument does not suffice, and therefore turns to a central idea of psychotherapy: affect 
tolerance" Zetzel coined this term to convey the idea that individuals differ in their ability or 
tendency to resist extreme emotional states. One who could be described as having resilience 
and resistance to stress or grief, for example, would have a high affect tolerance. Schwartz gives 
an original example of culturally determined norms of pathologically classified behaviors: 
spousal grief. Claiming that simple mood improvement disconnects the individual from personal 
experience, he continues to criticize "mood brighteners" and their prescription for individuals 
who have been grieving for only one year. Schwartz cites rural Greece, where 5 years is the 
appropriate time for spousal bereavement - seemingly attributing the difference in length to 
cultural differences in affect tolerance. 
Kramer disputes these claims with an insufficient rebuttal, contending that he sees no 
problem with medicating bereavement that deviates from social norms. He builds his defense of 
Prozac on grounds that departure from cultural norms establishes illness. First, proving one 
example of a phenomenon as invalid when the grounds for this proof are questionable does not 
render a claim impotent. Kramer has not shown that the central point is invalid: despite rural 
Greece and its widows, experiential recovery does lead to integration of experience and chemical 
mood improvement does lead to disconnection from experience. Secondly, Kramer seems to 
miss the point: doctors are treating normal variations of human experience as diseases. He 
misses it so dramatically that he uses it as grounds for dismissal. Third, the fact that anti-
depressants are the method of treatment employed in bereavement cases is crucial to Schwartz's 
argument. Schwartz is not making a statement about anthropology - he criticizes a specific 
mode of therapy that is used in a wider range of cases than is ethically appropriate. Kramer 
dismisses an ethical contention against the liberal use of mood-brighteners in two pages of text, 
without an effective argument. It should be evident from the distinctions made here that his 
assessment has little validity. 
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The next on Kramer's list of Prozac nay sayers, Randolph Nesse utilizes the evolutionary 
perspective of biological psychology to bring the notion of utility in anxiety towards a 
commentary on mood brighteners. Mild depression can be explained in animals as a mechanism 
designed to reallocate energy and resources. Nesse suggests that a similar situation may be at 
work among mankind. It follows that individuals suffering from sub-clinical dis-ease with no 
clear experiential cause should recognize that evolutionary mechanisms might be at work. 
Further, Nesse establishes that a sense of guilt for the condition should be relieved upon 
recognition of this fact. These sensations of anxiety and depression that are sub-clinical and 
socially stimulated should be accepted as a useful evolutionary mechanism, not as an illness. In 
conclusion, mood brighteners may not be an appropriate response to such emotional states. 
Kramer transforms these theoretical, atavistic experiences into an animal-like element of 
human experience that perhaps should be relieved through medication - as a "particularly 
humane intervention.,,47 Again, it seems that Kramer disagrees with an element of the opposing 
argument that was taken for granted within its line of reasoning. Nesse seems concerned with 
the fact that a natural, evolutionary condition that may still have validity in modern society has 
come to be viewed as a negative trait and treated as a disease. Prescription medications with 
possible serious and permanent side effects are appropriate for illnesses alone. If a naturally 
developed human condition that is recognizably sub-clinical should be altered, such a procedure 
should be made by other means. Prozac is not a vitamin or mineral with plainly positive effects. 
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SSRI's are a strong, serious, and poorly understood class of drugs that directly influence the 
brain in ways that markedly shift behavior and physiology. Nesse did not have the knowledge to 
argue this point, yet the issue that he does address is not effectively undermined by Kramer's 
opposing argument. 
Kramer discusses the major objections of Schwartz & Nesse as follows: "they 
(unhelpfully) free the taker from struggling with reality and thus achieving affect tolerance; they 
act to reinforce dehumanizing social expectations; they interfere with adaptive mechanisms 
developed over eons of evolution; and they encourage people to understand as illness aspects of 
the self that are normal. 48" Kramer responds to each claim in tum, attempting to invalidate these 
general objections to Prozac. In protest to Schwartz's claims about affect tolerance, Kramer 
returns to Zetzel's psychotherapeutic methods. A quick comparison provides Kramer with one 
of his favorite analogies in defense of Prozac: "What happens to people in psychotherapy is 
similar to what happens when they take Prozac." 49 Objections to Prozac in preference of 
"human" therapy are dismissed as pharmacological Calvinism. The problem for Schwartz, 
according to Kramer, is not what Prozac aims to accomplish, but that it is a chemical agent rather 
than an interpersonal one. Consequently, Kramer establishes a similar argument against the 
contention that Prozac use reinforces the dehumanization of social expectation. By arguing that 
if varied emotional and interpersonal states are natural, he claims that Prozac only shifts an 
individual between states that already exist. As many have, he therefore likens SSRI use to 
plastic surgery and psychotherapy in that both medical and cosmetic applications exist. Again, if 
this is true, the problem with Prozac must be its means and not its end. 
There are two problems with Kramer's dismissal of these claims. First, interpersonal 
interaction (within the context of therapy) aims at the realization of both self-understanding and 
autonomy. Prozac cannot provide these, for pills do not explain their effects to each individual 
as they alter emotional experience. Understanding of the self plays no role in the inhibition of 
serotonin re-uptake at the appropriate neurons in the brain. The swallowing of a pill and its 
anticipated effects may be entirely intentional and voluntary, yet the chemical process is not 
interactive. Further, the recurrence of depression or anxiety after the cessation of SSRI 
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mono therapy alone is far higher than recurrence rates for dual therapy or psychotherapy. 
Autonomy is not established through Prozac if the individual requires an indefinite prescription 
in order to maintain its desired outcomes. Second, analogy to previously accepted practice does 
not validate potentially unacceptable new ones. Several independent studies have replicated 
findings proving that SSRI's can cause permanent brain damage in long-term users. There have 
obviously been no reported cases of psychotherapy causing permanent brain damage. Beyond 
implications of serious side effects, Kramer makes what Erik Parens calls an argument of 
precedent.5o He describes it as follows: "We've always used means A to achieve end A; means 
B also aims to achieve end A; therefore means B is morally unproblematic." 
Two problems arise when using such an argument, and Kramer makes both mistakes. 
First, when treating different means as morally the same, one potentially makes the error of 
assuming that the means have the same object, or focus. For example, assuming that Prozac is 
morally acceptable and just as authentic as psychotherapy implies that altering understanding and 
a specific behavior set is morally equivalent to directly altering a set of chemicals in the brain 
that are intimately connected with that set of behaviors. In assuming that such a distinction is 
irrelevant, one further implies that the end results of each means are not contingent upon this 
difference. In fact , the ends must be unequivocally different because of this distinction. 
Interpersonal therapeutic processes occur along individually tailored paths, as an interaction 
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particular to both therapist and client. Serotonin receptors are affected in the same fashion in all 
human brains when an SSRI is introduced. 51 One cannot ignore this difference if attempting to 
qualify the two methods of therapy as equal. On the other hand, different means often embody 
or embrace different ideals. By advocating drug therapy for conditions that have proven 
potential for success through psychotherapy of various kinds, one embraces the mechanization of 
man. 52 Kramer himself points in his introduction to the striking trend at the turn of the twentieth 
century for our society to view our behaviors along a trend he describes as biological 
materialism. He specifically refers to the medicalization of the man he calls Sam as a disturbing 
phenomenon - that which he dubs "Listening to Prozac." 
Revealing the Self and Balancing the Humors 
Kramer makes many revealing statements about his personal experiences with Prozac. One of 
the most radical assertions he makes about the drug asserts that Prozac has utility as a kind of 
yardstick of the self. "They learned something about themselves from Prozac .... they believed 
Prozac revealed what in them was biologically determined and what merely experiential.,,53 
This statement is not only flawed, yet is also indicative of a serious problem occuring in the 
mainstream and how it responds to concepts of disease and medicine. SSRI's are not 
instruments designed to determine which authentic elements of the self are due to genetics and 
which are due to experience. First, Prozac does not return the chemical state of the brain to some 
previous state that should be considered any more proper or healthy. Prozac makes distinct 
changes in brain chemistry that result in a certain set of healthier behaviors because it 
specifically imbalances the current brain chemistry towards this end. This has been shown 
empirically through studies exploring the long-term side effects of SSRI'S.54 Generally, 
fluoxetine (Prozac) results in less receptivity to the chemical serotonin. All of the desired 
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changes associated with fluoxetine have been tied specifically to this chemica1.55 The brain's 
methods of detecting its levels of serotonin are disturbed, however. As a result, levels of 
dopamine - a chemical closely related to and highly interactive with serotonin - theoretically 
shift in response to these changes. Eventually, a far more complex set of reactions begins to 
occur as the brain tries desperately to achieve balance. Increasing resistance to the initial drug 
treatment, semi-permanent damage (tardive dyskinesia, a symptom of Parkinson's disease) due 
to shifting dopamine levels, and dramatic shifts in behavior result. 56 These changes in outward, 
social behavior are the designed purpose of SSRI' s and the reason the drug is perceived as a 
normalizer. SSRI's do not restore original, natural chemical balance to the brain. SSRI's do not 
repair genetically determined damage to the complex system of receptors and enzymes in the 
human brain. They shift the manifestation of these chemicals to a level that must not be in any 
biological sense more normal, since brain damage is a proven long-term result. This new 
manifestation is apparently more normal or at least desirable in a social sense, however, for news 
of replicated studies proving the deteriorating effects of long term SSRI use must be unpopular 
and has yet to become mainstream. 
Second, this erroneous supposition that changes due to a drug such as Prozac are "fixing" 
biologically determined states and bypassing experiential ones harbors a serious error of 
causality. Many studies have proven that a genetic component exists for psychological states 
such as depression. None have shown that major depression, generalized anxiety, or even 
obsessive compUlsive disorder (OeD) have purely genetic roots, however. All of these disorders 
are treatable with both SSRI's and psychotherapy. Obviously, shifts in brain chemistry cause 
shifts in behavior, yet one must recognize that it also runs the other way, and shifts in behavior 
cause shifts in brain chemistry. Each represents and controls the other, and attributions of 
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strictly biological causality to psychological phenomena should be made with great care. 
Elements of experiential personality that can be distinguished from genetic personality (and vice 
versa) do not exist with any real clarity, as each are merely constructs developed for the sake of 
linguistic ease. Moreover, the chaotic nature of human experience and the complexity of our 
genetic framework are such that distinctions of this sort are inherently fallible. To retrace our 
steps temporarily, let me reiterate that these disorders are treatable with either drug therapy or 
psychotherapy. There is strong evidence that drug therapy is more likely to succeed over a 
shorter period of time. Permanence after use of the drug has ceased is much less likely, however, 
save in cases of dual therapy (implementing both drug therapy and cognitive-behavioral 
therapy). If the use of Prozac restores or repairs biologically damaged brain tissue, why is it that 
conditions of melancholy, depression, anxiety, shyness, obsession, and compulsion are more 
likely to relapse after the cessation of Prozac monotherapy than after the cessation of dual 
therapy?57 Cognition, emotion, memories, or even attitudes must play some very integral role in 
these disorders, independent of their root in biological factors. If the objectionable elements of 
our personalities are purely biological and the desired elements due strictly to experience, why is 
it that the chances of relapse under drug therapy are so much higher? The conception that certain 
psychological disorders are caused by a disease - e.g. by a "chemical imbalance" - does not 
stand well against a realistic evaluation of these causal attributions. 
There exists a third reason that Prozac could not have "revealed what in [the patients] 
was biologically determined and what merely experiential." Psychopharmacological agents 
could cause any number of changes in human behavior. The fact that LSD may cause a person 
to see themselves as a Martian and behave in a strikingly Martian manner does not mean that the 
person taking LSD is truly a Martian, and only a human due to flaws in his genetic make-up. He 
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may well believe this to be the case under the influence of the drug, yet this does not mean that 
his authentic self is such. Similarly, Prozac does not release a true self from within an 
unfortunately determined shell just because one feels like one's true self after taking the drug. 
One could argue that this analogy is inappropriate since LSD is classified as a hallucinogen, and 
Prozac as an anti-depressant. Both change brain chemistry, however, in critical ways that alter 
personal experience - one should not carelessly qualify SSRI's as resulting in authentic 
experiences of self because they are comfortable ones that patients identify as their true selves. 
Kramer himself points to the notion that scientists attend to the evidence that best 
supports social needs. Our society, arguably strained by alienation, loneliness and depression, 
wants to hear that our current state is due to a biological cause over which we have no personal 
control. It is easier to accept a "chemical imbalance" at work within the numinous brain. Such a 
problem naturally should be fixed with chemicals. In a world of prescription marketing, I 
presume that it is far more comfortable living spiritually addicted to derivatives of Prozac than 
desperately groping at signs of meaning. However, should we as individuals accept this state of 
affairs, we may become substance-driven robots, treating ourselves with drugs of complacency 
that our television offers in return for extended mindlessness. 
Comfort induced by chemicals does not prove discomfort induced by chemicals. 
Unfortunately, the new and public biochemical model of human behavior often neglects the 
complex causality of the brain. Such a viewpoint supports the notion mentioned above of 
"chemical imbalance." Empedocles' medicine of the four cardinal humors exemplifies a similar 
approach. Each of four bodily components (bile, blood, phlegm, and lymph) was said to relate 
causally with temperament. To make the mistake that serotonin, a chemical directly affected by 
SSRI's, is solely responsible for depression or OCD is a fallacy. Causation is not something 
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simple and discrete, a default relationship in a one-way causal attribution. Our understanding of 
causality must embrace the organic causality, and a more complex understanding of the human 
brain should be coupled with the understanding that causation does not occur in one-way paths 
with obvious relationships as the only valid ones. None of the arguments in the nature vs. 
nurture debate have ended this controversy, and a compromise is the only realistic interpretation 
of this issue that can be made. In addition, the justification for drug therapy over psychotherapy 
often makes the mistake that if a certain supplement to brain chemistry "fixes" the behavioral 
component of that therapy, some sort of deficiency or excess is being repaired. 
Prozac as Enhancement 
The Hastings Center in Garrison, New York has conducted at least two major projects 
concerning the role that enhancement technologies play in our society. Issues at hand include, 
but are not confined to, the distinction between treatment and enhancement, the social 
consequences of large scale enhancement, the medicalization of human experience, the 
oppressiveness of suspect social norms, and the ethics of providing, promoting, and participating 
in human enhancement through technology. In 1998, the Hastings Center published a collection 
of essays about enhancement called Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications, 
as part of a larger series on bioethics. Several of the essays are directly concerned with the 
matter at hand: the uneasiness felt by many in response to Prozac and other similar drugs that are 
used in a sub-clinical setting, with the express purpose of "improving" behavior. As a follow-up 
and more specific response to the more controversial issues presented in this volume, the 
Hastings Center devoted nearly an entire issue of its Hastings Center Report to discussions of 
Prozac and the problematic ethics that surround its use as a cosmetic agent. Several of the essays 
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included are direct responses to other commentaries that have been reprinted in order to show an 
array of opinions concerning Prozac. 
Most of the claims made by these thinkers stress the ethical difficulties raised by Prozac 
because of its implications on authenticity and consequences to society. Parens, the editor of 
Enhancing Human Traits, discusses issues of enhancement technologies in three categories of 
unease: unfairness, complicity, and inauthenticity. First, he discusses unfairness in a social 
context. Social stratification as a result of competition made through prescription medicine 
could result in unfairness in contemporary society. Under this assumption, money would 
become an even greater figure in establishing social worth when psychological functioning at 
sub-clinical levels is paid for. Parens cites President Clinton's "Science in the 21 st Century," part 
of which states, "Science must not create a new line of separation between the haves and the 
have-nots. ,,58 
Second, Parens relates worries of complicity. Condoning this theoretical personal use of 
psychotropic medication implies complicity in a social phenomenon of potentially drastic 
proportions: avoidance of problems among the self, relatives, and peers. This implicates 
practitioners, patients, and those establishing mental health policy. 59 Arguments of autonomy in 
defense of SSRI therapy dissolve in this perspective, for values must be upheld by those 
responsible for controlling the use of medicine. 
His final worry, and the one most applicable here, is one of inauthenticity. Turning away 
from the vulnerability, imperfection, and finitude that constitutive of life itself could have vast 
negative effects on our society according to Parens. Sub-clinical Prozac use risks the loss of 
humanity on several levels, and a reconstruction of how we conceive of ourselves. The 
consequences he foresees and attributes to authenticity are perhaps more tenebrous and vague 
than those discussed here. They undoubtedly relate to consequences on a larger more social 
scale than the more personal arguments of Peter Kramer or Carl Elliott would. 
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Elliott contributes an article to this work entitled "The Tyranny of Happiness: Ethics and 
Cosmetic Psychopharmacology." Elliott's 'ethics of authenticity' can be dissected from out of 
his article in the following manner: We often conceive of our life as a project for which we are 
ultimately responsible. The significance of that project depends upon the way in which we lead 
it and participate in its development. Further, one must be true to oneself, and answer the 
question, "How should I live?" by looking inward. The unhappiness into which one's project 
has developed is owned, and one is responsible for the results of their own project. An important 
distinction made here by Elliott's article is that between authenticity and self-fulfillment. Each is 
nebulous in definition, especially when used in a conversational context. DeGrazia and Kramer 
argue that Prozac contributes to self-fulfillment, turning authenticity into a different and difficult 
construct, and their view seems popular. The two concepts undoubtedly overlap, yet self-
fulfillment is different, for it implies a quest for success as opposed to a quest for the self. 
Authenticity reduces to self-fulfillment when our national ideology tends to stress 
personal, individualized success as the primary goal of life. If each of us cannot accept that our 
'true' selves may not be successful and wealthy, the authentic self for whom we search becomes 
an idealized self that succeeds. Such is the case despite qualities of the experiential self that may 
be truly intrinsic to self-definition. A divide arises therefore, between the idealized self that 
reaches for fulfillment, and the observed self that strives for expression. This potentially 
provides a source for the existential angst and alienation that Elliott discusses as the font of SSRI 
popularity. Contemporary culture, evidently stricken with a wave of identity crises, answers to 
these issues in one of three ways. We medicate ourselves, to bury the parts of ourselves that we 
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wish didn't exist. We become someone else for a time, to avoid the stress of that which we 
really are. We become ourselves through painful and anxious self-confrontation. How can 
America resolve the disparity between her ideals of individualism and freedom, and her ideals of 
competition and conformity? 
A Philosophical Disease 
In his rebuttal included in the same 2000 Hastings Center Reporlo, Kramer refers to a notion 
that Carl Elliott suggests in "Pursued by Happiness and Beaten Senseless,,,61 and A Philosophical 
Disease.62 Elliott argues that American Capitalist culture is decidedly alienated from a 
meaningful sense of identity and purpose. His literary evocations strike readers with images of 
despair that come from a societal situation, not a chemical imbalance in the brain. Such a state, 
in an era fascinated by technology, medicated by multibillion-dollar industries, individualized by 
competition, and driven by a national pursuit of happiness, begs for Prozac. Kramer's 
interpretation of the text63 leads the reader to believe that the popularity of this claim is supported 
by the notion that our culture values melancholia and alienation as the appropriate response to 
our current situation by suggesting that we find sadness appealing. Furthermore, he suggests that 
we think of someone as fake or shallow, even when not on medication, if they seem happy or 
extroverted. According to Kramer, we think of Prozac as inauthentic because we think of 
happiness as an inappropriate response to our world. 
Kramer's claims are valid and truly indicative of the current situation in American 
society, yet these generalizations are just that, and are far from pervasive. Further, Elliott does 
not seem to want to prove that our society is taking Prozac in response to cultural dilemmas 
because he thinks that we should be sad. He expresses a philosophical argument that is 
illuminating: we should be sad in response to our cultural situation because we need to change 
our cultural situation. The avoidance of personal anxiety in significant numbers, through drug 
induced complacency, could lead to the aggravation of currently destructive social issues. 
Acknow ledging our widespread condition of loss and alienation brings us closer to cultural 
changes that will create meaning and satisfaction in our lives. 
38 
39 
Final Argumen t 
• Inauthentic personal changes are made in flight from potential authenticity. 
The sub-clinical use of Prozac, when other options for self-actualization and the attainment of 
desired subjective states is available, even at a sacrifice, is by this premise inauthentic. In order 
to move towards authenticity in personal change, one should attempt all means of self-realization 
and awareness. The use of Prozac as a component of dual therapy is acceptably authentic here, 
as the most common changes to subjective experience induced by Prozac are more conducive to 
therapy than dysthymia,64 generalized anxiety, or mild OCD. 
• Specific actions or personal projects conducted so as to escape from an anxiety-provoking 
element of personal experience increase ambiguity and therefore reduce personal 
authenticity. 
Under this premise, many forms of therapy would be deemed inauthentic. Idealistically, 
psychodynamic65 therapy confronts anxiety and treats it as the manifestation of repressed past 
experiences (e.g. oedipal conflicts, child abuse) and could therefore be used in an authentic 
fashion here. It could be easily argued, however, that the experience of psychodynamic therapy 
itself brings about remission of undesired psychological states and that actual resolution of 
internalized conflict is a subjective illusion. Many forms of therapy such as cognitive-
behavioral66 therapy would be just as guilty as drug therapy of treating symptoms directly in 
order to avoid the confrontation of the experiential source. Clients that actively or through 
encouragement undergo monotherapy with psychotropic medication, again when other options 
are feasible, can be described as undergoing an inauthentic change by this premise. 
• A change made in avoidance of or in replacement for personal knowledge must be 
inauthentic. 
Again, the notion of avoidance and escape returns, telling us not to evade our selves, but rather to 
confront the things about ourselves that most disturb us. Resolution and awareness are of critical 
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importance here, for authenticity demands this confrontation. Kierkegaard's builds his 
philosophy of authentic action on the idea that anxiety is a necessary good that tells us that 
something is wrong in our lives. The only way to truly resolve such anxiety is through 
confrontation and internalization - which requires self-evaluation. Nesse's evolutionary 
approach is important here as well, for it stresses the same notions of anxiety from a biological 
perspective. Both humanistic and mechanistic schemas support the claim, which makes it 
difficult to undermine through theory. When specifically applied to SSRI use, this claim 
reiterates the importance of intention. If an individual chooses with determination, to resolve the 
self and through self-awareness change essential characteristics of the self, and a prescription 
drug either facilitates or contributes to this process, such a change would not necessarily reduce 
the authenticity of such a project. If, however, Prozac is an escape and an "easy out," the 
individual removes himself from his own authentic nature. 
• Confrontation of personal conflict is authentic in nature, while circumvention of personal 
conflict is inauthentic. 
An important, relevant, and perhaps understated notion that surrounds this issue of SSRI 
treatment is the escape metaphor. Escape from the self is not the only important behavior that 
should be addressed, however. Interpersonal relationships require commitments that often take 
the form of support structures. When someone close to another who is dealing with difficulties 
in their psychological well-being finds that the distressed has escaped them without resolving the 
issues that have affected the two together, it often leaves the support partner empty and without 
resolution. In addition, problems of depression and anxiety are often intimately connected to 
specific relationship situations. A pharmacological escape from such problems leaves the 
interpersonal situation and its problems on the shoulders of the other who has not chosen to 
resolve the issues chemically. Just as alcoholism provides an escape in this way and is 
uncontroversially destructive for this reason, Prozac use has great potential for creating 
inauthentic relationships. In order for a change in an interpersonal context to be authentic, both 
parties should address and confront those problems precipitating the change. 
• Personal changes that are made explicitly in order to remove those qualities that set an 
individual apart from his natural grouping can be described as inauthentic under 
McDonough's Aristotelian model. 
If a patient or client who is experiencing mild social anxiety disorder, for example, asks for 
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Prozac in order to become more sociable like the rest of her peers, her request may be described 
as inauthentic. Likewise, were an individual with a melancholic personality compelled by a 
doctor or family member to take Prozac in order to become more "normal," such behavior would 
be called inauthentic by this assumption. The medicalization of psychological states has driven 
perceptions of this kind forward since the development of the categorical model of 
psychopathological behavior. A distinction must be made that states that endangerment or pain 
in an individual may be perceived differently. The works of Heidegger and Kierkegaard may 
disagree, however, on the foundation that emotional suffering and anxiety must be confronted 
directly in order for personal change to become truly authentic. Works such as Fear and 
Trembling and The Stranger would suggest that sadness or despair should be dealt with head-on, 
and under any case avoidance of personal experience would be inauthentic. 
• Authentic choice must be made with self-possession, genuine pathos, and regard for all 
temporal modes. 
With this assumption, one can describe situations of sub-clinical Prozac use as inauthentic in 
three ways. First, if a client were to begin taking Prozac with little or no personal contemplation 
or self-evaluation, one could say that such was done without self-possession. Further, this 
implies that the choice to take Prozac must be deliberate and determined in order to meet 
qualifications of authenticity. Second, the client must choose Prozac with valid and authentic 
grief. This is difficult to imagine. Sadness or emotional intensity may drive a person to try 
Prozac as a way of relieving suffering, but one can hardly imagine someone choosing to take it 
order to embrace and confront the negative emotions one experiences. As above, however, this 
authenticity is feasible under said premise if intuitive therapy is impossible or great difficulty 
arises in the therapy due to the negative emotional states. Finally, one must regard all temporal 
modes when making an existential choice in order for it to maintain authenticity. A patient or 
her therapist/doctor could be theoretically ignoring all three temporal modes through the use of 
Prozac. If past experiences are in any way related to the negative affect Prozac is intended to 
treat, this sphere of experience is avoided in most cases of monotherapy. If present situations 
such as occupation or life style are being treated through Prozac, one avoids the current self. If 
the potential future of an individual is purposefully shaped into some false representation of 
either another person or of a society, his future has been falsely decided. 
• The choice of the private self is more authentic than the choice of the public ethos. 
To choose one' s own identity over that which is generally supported by the public is almost 
intuitively authentic. This assumption is not necessarily valid across all situations, however. 
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One would legitimately label a certain choice as inauthentic if it were made strictly in order to be 
different from that of the public. A change made specifically for the sake of being different 
rather than for the sake of a certain personality trait or significant experience. One could also 
make a valid choice that agrees with the public ethos, in harmony with the self. We do this often 
- even many times per day for the sake of social harmony and stability. To make a move that 
intrinsically shifts the personality away from its original state for the sake of the public ethos 
would be inauthentic, however. Taking Prozac without additional therapy would be 
categorically inauthentic, since one would have little need for Prozac if one were not interested 
in taking an active role in changing elements of his personality. 
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• When choice is not made in an active process of either the self, or the public, the "monstrous 
abstraction" that is the public will choose for us. Passive acceptance of this exterior will, 
and the influence it has on our un chosen choices is inauthentic. 
Similarly to the previous premise, this idea delineates social behavior as typically authentic or 
inauthentic; yet here the distinction lies between the activity and passivity of a choice made in a 
social setting. Again, there is little reason to look at the large array of related inauthentic 
behavior (that would be called such as a result of this assumption) as good or bad, right or 
wrong. Central to the point, however, is the notion that if very important, questionable changes 
are made for this reason, the compromise to authenticity will be significant. 
• Any process of personal change necessitates personal knowledge before it can be described 
as authentic. 
Those claims discussed above contribute to this qualification of authenticity. It has been stated 
that changes made in avoidance of personal awareness are inauthentic , yet this is also distinctly 
important to an understanding of authentic personal change. The act of avoidance in itself does 
not solely contribute to the inauthenticity of personal changes. More generally, personal changes 
that do not account for this self-awareness - though they may not represent escape -likewise 
make a move to undermine authenticity. Heidegger's notion of everydayness embodies the idea 
behind this qualification of authenticity.67 Personal changes that do not account for self-
awareness occur on a regular, if not daily basis in each of us. In the context of SSRI drug 
therapy, one could argue that most individuals lead an inauthentic lifestyle by definitions such as 
the one listed above. How then, can one justify changes to current practices concerning drug 
therapy with this assumption as support? The possibility that many members of our society are 
relying on yet another escape from self-recognition is great. One can compare Prozac use to beer 
or marijuana, and the argument seemingly melts away. There is an essentially problematic 
reason that Prozac use should be evaluated on a different level. Doctors and mental health 
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practitioners maintain a healer's role. It is not a medical responsibility to administer beer to 
patients who are having a difficult time with work or lifestyle. SSRI's, unlike beer, would be a 
serious and drastic method of absolving woes and discomforts - the class of drugs is monitored 
by the FDA as a prescription medication because of side-effects and an evident need for 
responsible administration of the drug. Social and individual consequences of widespread 
Prozac use are discussed throughout medical literature on the subject, yet at the core Prozac is 
different from beer because it is the responsibility of medical professionals to carefully 
administer the drug professionally. If someone comes to a doctor seeking therapy or healing of 
the self, it is the doctor's responsibility to provide this end. Further, if that patient believes their 
condition to be strictly biological without biological evidence, they may not accurately interpret 
this condition and should not be held responsible for its diagnosis. It therefore falls upon the 
doctor's shoulders to conscientiously determine the most appropriate means of treatment for such 
a hypothetical patient. Because the suitable treatment potentially includes personal therapy, 
medical professionals should be held responsible for acknowledging the importance of this 
distinction. 
• Authentic self-evaluation must point inward and seek knowledge that independently 
differentiates the individual. 
Just as the former claim asserts that authenticity requires self-knowledge through the 
existentialist construct of everydayness, this claim builds a plea for self-knowledge upon 
Heidegger's notion of averageness. Differentiation is as important to authenticity as self-
evaluation. One leaves behind the same qualities of the self that potentially contribute to 
authentic change if one ignores or denies individuality. We are all the product of our 
experiences to some degree. Setting aside strictly biological approaches to the self, one must 
accept that this self, for whom an authentic individual strives, is unique because each of us has a 
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unique set of experiences. Therefore, differentiation of the products of those experiences is a 
necessary property of valid self-evaluation. 
• Only through accepting one's own self and experiencing its owned anxiety can one approach 
personal authenticity. 
Self-acceptance works its way into a discussion of authenticity and self-awareness because if one 
denies the attributes of the self that one attempts to change, one cannot truly understand why one 
has become the person that he is. Understanding is crucial to authentic change because a person 
may become a distinct though desirable person through a change without understanding, yet an 
authentic change of self would be one of transition and evolution rather than one of replacement. 
Changes induced by Prozac are not understood on an internal level unless a process including 
self-evaluation occurs. If one prescribes Prozac to remove unaccepted attributes of a patient that 
has not attempted to understand these attributes, this practitioner contributes to a change in his 
patient that undermines that individual's authentic self. Psychotherapy proposes a method by 
which the patient takes on those traits that are undesirable and owns them in order to attain 
control of them. Such a change is authentic, for it confronts and accepts the self both before and 
after rather than removing one for the preferable other. 
• The perception of anxiety as an element of imbalance due to a foreign agent is far less 
authentic than the perception of anxiety as an element of balance owned by the essentially 
experiential self 
Our conception of depression and anxiety often contributes to our understanding of authentic 
development. A medicalized self, with any undesirable traits explained away by chemical 
imbalances, does not support experience and personal differentiation as the assertions above 
would require of the authentic self. Ownership, acceptance, awareness, understanding, and 
resolution are all denied when conditions of valid human experience are washed away by 
medical terminology and diagnoses. This destructive biological materialism that pervades 
American society reduces our interior selves to alien attributes that should be monitored and 




I do not deign to assert that everyone should seek authenticity. Heidegger himself never 
explicitly states that authenticity is a manifest good. Each of the categories through which he 
describes human modes of behavior can be used as a means of evaluating an individual's 
approach to the self. Nevertheless, the description of one particular category in his list as 
necessarily good becomes problematic and paternalistic. The purpose of this analysis is to 
clarify the authentic or inauthentic nature of drug therapy in the specific context so frequently 
debated upon in professional journals. By the evaluations established here, arguments describing 
Prozac use as inauthentic and likewise those describing it as inauthentic are supported or 
undermined depending on specific contextual elements' of each theoretical situation. It becomes 
essential, therefore, to stress the importance of medical professionals who act in an educated and 
conscientious manner, effectively and appropriately approaching each case with ethical and 
critical scrutiny. Doctors, just as any other person, will make mistakes; and likewise just as there 
are people who act without ethical consideration, there will be doctors who do the same. 
There is not an inherent assumption in the arguments presented here that members of the 
medical profession act whole or in part unethically, and as a result require philosophical 
valuations to correct this behavior. The point, on the other hand, is to emphasize the degree to 
which the construct of authenticity plays a critical role in psychological and psychiatric treatment 
of these sub-clinical disorders. If a patient or client requests a specific treatment such as Prozac, 
it is ultimately the practitioner's responsibility to determine the nature of the request and 
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diagnose the potential problems at the root of the request. Authenticity has been used in vague 
and indeterminate ways in order to defend or criticize drug therapy since the release of Prozac. 
Through the clarifications of this analysis of authenticity, a more methodological and logical 
approach to the issues at hand arises, and a more critical interpretation of these arguments is 
possible. However, such clarification of academic issues is not the only benefit of ungerstanding 
authenticity in the context of drug therapy. 
Arguments made based on existential ideals such as authenticity are important to an 
evaluation of our culture, at least part of which has an evident respect for existentialism, and 
currently struggles with identity and authenticity on a level that is indicative of a social unease. 
Although practitioners are ultimately responsible for the administration of these drugs, we must 
acknowledge our own role in establishing our lives and identities. We want to succeed, but 
evidence of the condition of our ethos lies in our popular culture, and it is telling us that we do 
not accept success-fulfillment at any cost as an acceptable approach to life. If we value personal 
authenticity and self-resolution, we are responsible for monitoring the effects that phenomena 
such as Prozac have on our society as a whole. Complacent emptiness is not an attribute that 
many Americans would be proud to call our own - and we should therefore express and confront 
our discontent, rather than hiding behind the comfort of a cosmetic drug. 
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